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  • Seminar

    Seminar
    speaker Qinggong Wu, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology time Tuesday,Dec.3, 13:30-15:00
    place Room 217, Guanghua Building 2

    Economics Seminar(2019-20


    TopicRobust Binary Voting

    SpeakerQinggong Wu, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

    TimeTuesday,Dec.3, 13:30-15:00 

    LocationRoom 217, Guanghua Building 2

     

    Abstract:

    In this paper, we study a new robustness concept in mechanism design with interdependent values: interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility (IDSIC). It requires each agent to have an interim dominant strategy, i.e., conditional on her own private information, the strategy maximizes her expected payo? for all possible strategies the other agents could use. In a simple setting with two alternatives and no transfers, we characterize IDSIC together with two other well studied concepts: dominant strategy incentive compatibility(DSIC) and ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC). While both DSIC and EPIC permit only constant mechanisms in su?ciently rich environments, non-constant IDSIC mechanisms exist in any environment. The characterization of IDSIC suggests a simple class of (indirect) binary voting rules: Eachagentreports Yes/No. Moreover, if the binary voting rule is also additive, then the indirect mechanism is versatile: It admits an interim dominant strategy equilibrium on all payo? environments and all corresponding type spaces.

    Introduction:

    I am a game theorist with a focus on mechanism design. I also have worked on auctions, communication and matching. I received my PhD from the University of Michigan in 2016.

    Your participation is warmly welcomed!












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